By Laith Dababneh*

For decades, the King of Jordan established committees through royal decrees tasked with crafting agendas aimed at enhancing the social, political, and economic well-being of citizens.

Despite a series of reform ideas, including the most recent “Economic Modernization Vision”—each touted as a progressive plan to advance Jordan’s global standing—meaningful progress remains elusive. The most recent plans face significant obstacles, including heightened geopolitical tensions in the region, entrenched economic monopolies, uninformed local politicians, and an ill-equipped lower house lacking effective oversight.

Additionally, implementing these reforms has met hesitation from the established powers within the ruling elite, who stand to lose control and privileges from its implementation.

Public sentiment reflects growing skepticism regarding the current Economic Modernization Vision. The Economic Modernization Vision has four main objectives: Unleash the economic potential of Jordan, Build the future for generations through innovation and modernization, develop a roadmap for political parties, and implement rigorous follow-up mechanisms to ensure this Vision’s continuity.

Phase I, 2022 to 2025, is intended to lay a foundation with tangible progress in the Jordanian market, setting the stage for Phase II. Phase II, 2026 to 2029, aims to build on the progress of Phase I by leveraging emerging opportunities. The final Phase III, 2030 through 2033, lacks a detailed road map, with a related plan scheduled to be developed in 2029, outlined on page 103, “The related plan will be developed in 2029.”

One key aspect of the modernization vision is its commitment to developing a road map for political parties. Despite these ambitious goals, the enactment of the cybercrime law raised concerns regarding the alignment of these objectives with the government’s actions. The passing of the Cybercrime law hindered two of the Vision’s main goals—unleashing economic potential and developing a robust political landscape—even before the completion of Phase I.

As highlighted by Vedant Patel, Principal Deputy Spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State, in July 2023, “The proposed cybercrime law submitted to the Jordanian parliament limits freedom of expression online and offline and could inhibit future investment in the technology sector. This type of law, with vague definitions and concepts, could undermine Jordan’s homegrown economic and political reform efforts and further shrink the civic space that journalists, bloggers, and other members of civil society operate in Jordan. We reiterate that for countries to thrive there must be protections for freedom of expression, open debate, vibrant discourse, and information sharing, including online via press and social media platforms.”

The law shrouded in ambiguity contradicts the Vision’s goal of fostering open political dialogue, challenging the Government’s commitment to developing a road map for political parties. Onto that, The Global Freedom Index (Freedom House) assessed Jordan as “NOT FREE” and has been declining yearly. If current laws are restricting civil liberties, as indicated by the Global Freedom Index. How can the Government implement holistic reform? As local and regional scale political reform is as necessary as economic reform, one cannot come before the other both are interwoven.

Local on-ground efforts across different governorates have been no different. I attended a meeting with an anonymous municipality. After the meeting, I asked the Vice-Mayor about the municipality’s plan to align with the Economic Modernization Vision. The Vice-Mayor candidly shared that the municipality has no specific plan to propel the area towards the Vision, stating that this is a situation common in other municipalities.

If local municipalities are not actively working to attract investment into districts, improve waste management, manage urban development effectively, and resolve other matters, how can the national Vision be realized? The apparent lack of communication and coordination suggests that the vision is not fully conveyed to stakeholders, or when it has, the focus has been on its significance rather than concrete implementation strategies.

This matter underscored on page 120, outlines the importance of “A Unified Vision: One of the most critical success factors is having a unified Vision that streamlines efforts of various entities and successive governments towards the achievement of the identified goals.” Based on discussions with members of this municipality, local officials lack communication and coordination with the Government’s Vision even after three years of the agenda.

As the Economic Modernization Vision approaches its third year, recent data from the World Bank indicates that the government’s financial commitments increased by 343.32% since 2022. The rise in commitments contrasts the Vision’s objective of “Reducing demand for government financing.” This discrepancy suggests a potential challenge in aligning practices with Vision’s Goals.

The misalignment in goals and actions of the government points towards critical concerns about the vision’s implementation and oversight. Monitoring processes are crucial to ensuring the viability of any agenda’s key objectives, yet the mechanisms remain inadequate and, in many ways, inferior to those established under Vision 2005. The lower house, which should play a central role in enforcing checks and balances, continues to be sidelined. Instead, the government relies on four key entities: The Royal Hashemite Court, the Ministry of International Cooperation, the Prime Ministry’s Delivery Unit, and the Cabinet of Ministers’ Delivery Units. This reliance on executive entities for oversight raises serious concerns about the effectiveness and transparency of the Vision’s implementation, as it circumvents traditional mechanisms of accountability. The fact that the government oversees its progress without adequate legislative oversight not only challenges the sovereignty of the Lower House of Jordan but also underscores a significant weakness in the parliamentary system. This lack of trust in the lower house’s ability to enforce checks and balances on reform agendas highlights the necessity of political reform alongside genuine economic reform. In 2005, the government aimed to develop a separate Ministry overseeing reform. Today, the implementation of internal checks and balances that are implausible for effective oversight represents a step backward in time.

To date, the Jordanian market has yet to see tangible evidence of Phase I’s success as the public eagerly awaits progress reports. The unsuccessful implementation of Phase I will jeopardize the whole Vision, as it is foundational to the success of Phases II and III. The ambiguity in current laws hinders the Governments’ aspirations of political parties, and the lack of plausible oversight hinders the implementation of the Vision. Shortcomings in achieving the four key objectives—unleashing Jordan’s economic potential, building a future for generations through innovation, developing a political road map, and ensuring rigorous follow-up—will cast doubt on the government’s commitment to comprehensive reform. Polls indicate the increasing public resentment and numbness towards numerous reform attempts. The government’s ambitious plans are in place but translating them into on-ground progress remains an obstacle.

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The writer is a recent Jordanian high school graduate and a freshman at Portland Community College. Since the age of 13, he has engaged in interviews with prominent businessmen and politicians throughout the region, seeking to deepen his understanding of the Jordanian political and economic landscape. Laith is currently being mentored by Dr. Marwan Muasher, who has guided him in the development of this article.